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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
The problem of juvenile delinquency has many facets, but a growing
concern on the part of the public in the more easily observed and propertydestroying proclivities of certain delinquents is beginning to break through
in the form of a variety of statutes designed to impose a degree of parental
responsibility for the anti-social aspects of juvenile conduct. It could be
said that violence of the type in question, although grave in nature, has
often been over-emphasized to the point where the more subtle psychological, sociological, economic and moral features thereof have become
obscured. In fact, many explanations in the form of "cause and effect"
relationships have been evolved. The question remains, however, whether
legislation on the subject would provide an answer or would serve as an
answer at all.
In that respect, the public concern is at least two-fold in character,
being first directed at providing an effective civil remedy by which the
injured party may pursue those deemed by the public to be responsible,
or at least partly responsible, for the juvenile delinquent's anti-social
acts; and, in the second place, with the prevention of further misconduct
by utilizing judicially imposed penalties, under proceedings initiated by
public officials, to stimulate parents to discharge parental obligations. It
would be easy to say that juvenile delinquency is manifestly on the
increase; that it has been aggravated by the growth of intensely populated
areas, and that, with the disappearance of simple pleasures and an overworship of things material, there has been a weakening of the community's
collective conscience. It would seem too late, at this point, to expect a
return to an idyllic past, if one ever existed except in imagination.
It could, for that matter, also be pointed out that, in earlier times, the
waif, the widow, the unsung and the unwanted were largely ignored by
society, unless perchance they violated the then harsh provisions of the
criminal code. As direct fining and imprisonment of the juvenile delinquent appears to have done little more in the main than deepen the antisocial outlook, the question is posed as to whether or not it would be wise
to make parents vicariously responsible for the conduct of their offspring
in the hope that this would awaken dormant forces for social good and
regenerate an ameliorating area of control within the home.
Before that question can be answered, it might be well to take a brief
look at the law and at any legislation adopted to date. Under the common

NOTES AND COMMENTS

law, the existence of a parental relationship was not alone a sufficient basis
for placing liability upon the parent for the torts of the child for a masterservant, agency or similar relationship had to be shown in the event the
parent had not expressed some form of condonation with respect to the
child's act.' There has, however, been a trend in the case holdings tending
to expand parental liability either because of an exercise of a degree of
control over the child or because of a parent's knowledge, or imputed
knowledge of a type chargeable to any reasonably prudent person, concerning the vicious or mischievous propensities of the child to do acts which
would be injurious to the persons or property of others.2 In addition,
liability has been founded on the act of a parent in providing potentially
harmful and dangerous instruments, particularly so where the same have
been supplied to minor children who were either incapable or inexperienced
in the handling of such instruments.3
Certain of the jurisdictions so holding have differed over the extent to
which trends of this nature are to be carried, as may be seen from a
'Winfrey v. Austin, 260 Ala. 439, 71 So. (2d) 15 (1954) ; Johnston v. Orlando,
131 Cal. App. (2d) 705, 281 P. (2d) 357 (1955) ; Hice v. Pullum, 130 Colo. 302,
275 P. (2d) 193 (1954); Cerchio v. Mullins, 33 Dela. (3 W.W.Harr.) 245, 138 A.
277 (1937); Hubert v. Harpe, 181 Ga. 322, 182 S. E. 167 (1935); Normington v.
Neely, 58 Ida. 134, 70 P. (2d) 396 (1937) ; White v. Seitz, 342 Ill. 266, 174 N. E.
371 (1931), reversing 258 Il. App. 318 (1930); Paulin v. Howser, 63 Ill. 312
(1872) ; Teagarden v. McLaughlin, 86 Ind. 476, 44 Am. Rep. 332 (1882) ; Jolly v.
Doolittle, 169 Iowa 658, 149 N. W. 890 (1914); Forsythe v. Rexroat, 234 Ky. 173,
27 S. W. (2d) 695 (1930) ; Kerrigan v. Carroll, 168 Md. 682, 179 A. 53 (1935) ; Smith
v. Jordan, 211 Mass. 269, 97 N. E. 761 (1912) ; Kunda v. Briarcombe Farm Co., 149
Minn. 206, 183 N. W. 134 (1921); Howell v. Norton, 134 Miss. 616, 99 So. 440
(1924) ; Murphy v. Loeffler, 327 Mo. 1244, 39 S. W. (2d) 550 (1931) ; Clawson v.
Schroeder, 63 Mont. 488, 208 P. 924 (1933); Evers v. Krouse, 70 N. J. L. 653, 58
A. 181, 66 L. R, A. 592 (1904); Staple v. Bruns, 218 N. C. 780, 11 S. E. (2d) 460
(1940); Jamar v. Brightwell, 162 Okla. 124, 19 P. (2d) 368 (1933); Miller v.
Semler, 137 Ore. 610, 2 P. (2d) 233 (1931), rehearing den. 3 P. (2d) 987 (1931) ;
Miller v. Pettigrew, 10 S. W. (2d) 168 (Tex. Civ. App., 1938); Nixon v. Rowland,
192 Va. 47, 63 S. E. (2d) 757 (1951) ; Muggleston v. Glaittli, - Utah -, 258 P. (2d)
438 (1953).
2 Independently of the "family car" doctrine, not here considered, a parent has
been held liable In Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F. (2d) 641 (1930); Ellis v. D'Angelo,
116 Cal. App. (2d) 310, 253 P. (2d) 675 (1953) ; Zuckerberg v. Munzer, 277 App.
Div. 1061, 100 N. Y. S. (2d) 910 (1950), affirming 197 Misc. 791, 95 N. Y. S. (2d)
856 (1950) ; Gossett v. Van Egmond, 176 Ore. 134, 155 P. (2d) 304 (1945) ; Condel v.
Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 39 A. (2d) 51, 155 A. L. R. 81 (1944) ; Moody v. Clark, 266
S. W. (2d) 907 (Tex. Civ App., 1954) ; Norton v. Payne, 154 Wash, 241, 281 P. 991
(1929). But see contra: Martin v. Barrett, 120 Cal. App. (2d) 265, 261 P. (2d)
551 (1953); Gissen v. Goodwill, - Fla. -, 80 So. (2d) 701 (1955); Staruck v.
Otsego County, 285 App. Div. 476, 138 N. Y. S. (2d) 385 (1955), where a county,
acting n loco parenti8, was held not liable; and Littenberg v. McNamara, 136
N. Y. S. (2d) 178 (1954).
8 Dickens v. Barnham, 69 Colo. 349, 194 P. 356 (1920), a high-powered rifle;
Parman v. Lemmon, 119 Kan. 323, 244 P. 227, 44 A. L. R. 1500 (1925), a shotgun; Souza v. Irome, 219 Mass. 273, 106 N. E). 998 (1914), a shot-gun; Dinger v.
Burnham, 360 Mo. 465, 228 S. W. (2d) 696 (1950), a truck; Johnson v. Glidden,
11 S. D. 237, 76 N. W. 933, 74 Am. St. Rep. 795 (1898), a shot-gun; Mazzoechi v.
Sheay, 126 W. Va. 490, 29 S. E. (2d) 12 (1944), an air rifle.
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comparison of some of the cases. In the North Carolina case of Bowen v.
Newborn,4 for example, the court held that the immoral advice given to a
minor son by his father did not amount to a consent or ratification of the
particular immoral act which the minor had there perpetrated upon the
plaintiff. Where, however, the parent could be said to be in closer proximity to the delinquent act, as in the Wisconsin case of Statz v. Pohl,5
the parent might be held to be civilly liable for the child's conduct because
the parent might then be considered as impliedly giving a consent or
ratification.
It must also be noted that the cases concerned with vicious, malicious
or other abnormal propensities of children show further refinements with
respect to the extent of control and the degree of imputable foreseeable
knowledge the parent either had or should have had in relation to the
child's act. It has been said, in that connection, that reasonable care by the
parent to control the minor would be necessary if the parent had knowledge
of the child's abnormal propensities which would be likely to be dangerous
to others,0 and that the failure to exercise reasonable control in such a
situation would be enough to make the parent liable.7 But cases of this
nature can be distinguished from those holdings abovementioned in that
there is a difference between an alleged failure to exercise what could be
deemed to be the proper degree of parental control over a strong but
normal propensity on the one hand, even though such propensity be one
capable of being exercised in an anti-social manner, and a case wherein
there is a showing of actual knowledge of, and probable condonation for,
truly abnormal propensities which lead to delinquency on the part of the
minor.
Despite this, other jurisdictions have held that, for purpose of parental
liability, there must be an "habitual, intentional and specific wrongful act"
against others, plus the parent's failure to take precautions to guard
against such acts.' It was on this basis that the Florida court, in Gissen v.
Goodwfll, 9 held that parents who were aware of the vicious propensity
because of prior conduct on the child's part could not be held liable for
the particular act done, even though they had failed to restrain the child
as to the known course of conduct, because the act complained of was
unrelated to any of the earlier acts committed by the child. It would
4 218, N. C. 423, 11 S. E. (2d) 372 (1940).

5 266 Wis. 23, 62 N. W. (2d) 556 (1954). The act there complained of had been
committed in the presence of the parent, who made no effort to restrain the &iild.
6 Sawyer v. Kelly, 194 Okla. 516, 153 P. (2d) 97 (1941) ; Gossett v. Van Egmond,
176 Ore. 134, 155 P. (2d) 304 (1945).
TCondel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 29 A. (2d) 51, 155 A. L. IL 81 (1944).
8 Martin v. Barrett, 120 Cal. App. (2d) 265, 261 P. (2d) 551 (1953).
9- Fla. -, 80 So. (2d) 701 (1955).

NOTES AND

COMMENTS

appear, therefore, that courts might be inclined to determine the blameworthiness of the parents by first ascertaining whether or not the element
of habitualness on the part of the delinquent with respect to the particular
abnormal act is present, and then by determining whether or not the
parent had knowledge of the habitual quality thereof.
Much the same rationale has been followed in the dangerous instrumentality cases, for it has generally been held that the parent is not liable
if it can be shown that no reasonably prudent person could have foreseen
that such an instrument would prove to be dangerous in the hands of a
minor. 10 Liability has also been denied where the facts showed that the
minor had had adequate experience in the handling of the particular
dangerous instrument," and there was no negligence, knowledge, nor lack
12
of reasonable control on the part of the parent.
Just as there has been a general expansion in common-law doctrines,
so the civil law has shifted to some degree. The civil law generally imposed
liability upon the father and, after his decease, the mother, for the torts
of their minor children, unless the child's act could not have been prevented by the parent, 13 which liability could extend, to the same degree,
to teachers and others who had control over the child. While the Louisiana
civil code follows the French code as to many of its principles, it should
be noted that the saving exception has been omitted therefrom. 14 As a
consequence, in Johnson v. Butterworth,5 the court interpreted it to be
the intent of the Louisiana legislature, by this omission, to place the
economic responsibility for the child's tort upon the parent so as to make
this liability into an absolute one, all of which was contrary to those
exceptions or defenses which had been upheld in previous cases.' 6 Fortunately for the parent, this view has been softened by some later Louisiana
10 See Bateman v. Crim, 34 A. (2d) 257 (D.C., 1943), as to a football used in
a public street; Warner v. Barbin, 12 La. App. 640, 125 So. 766 (1930), for a case
involving a slingshot; Klop v. Vanden Bros., 263 Mich. 27, 248 N. W. 538 (1933),
where the weapon was a golf club; and Highson v. Creech, 17 Tenn. App. 573, 69
S. W. (2d) 249 (1933), concerning a toy air-gun.
"Rautbord v. Ehmann, 190 F. (2d) 533 (1951), a speed-boat case; Palm v.
Ivorson, 117 Ill. App. 55 (1905), where the harmful instrument was a shot-gun;
and Harris v. Cameron, 81 Wis. 239, 51 N. W. 437 (1892), a B.B. gun situation.
12 Chaddock v. Plummer, 88 Mich. 225, 50 N. W. 135, 14 L. R. A. 675 (189,1) ;
Clorine v. Addison, 182 Minn. 310, 234 N. W. 295 (1931) ; Knopf v. Muntz, 121 N.
Y. S. (2d) 422 (1952) ; Napiearlski v. Pickering, 273 App. Div. 456, 106 N. Y. S.
(2d) 28 (1951) ; Steinberg v. Cauchois, 249 App. Div. 518, 293 N. Y. S. 147 (1937) ;
White v. Page, - Ohio App. -, 105 N. E. (2d) 652 (1953) ; Highsaw v. Creech,
17 Tenn. App. 573, 69 S. W. (2d) 250 (1933).
'3 Code Civil, France, Art. 1384; Quebec Civil Code, Art. 1054.
14 West La. Stat. Ann., Civil Code, 1952, Vol. 9, Tit. 5, Art. 2318.
15 152 So. 166 (1934).
16 See Warner v. Barbin, 12 La. App. 640, 125 So. 766 (1930); Toca v. Rojas,
152 La. 317, 93 So. 108 (1922).
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cases, particularly by the holding in Phillips v. D'Amico,17 wherein it has
been pointed out that, while the statute does not contain the word "fault"
or the word "negligence," either the father or the child had to be at fault
or be negligent before liability could be imposed. It would thus appear
that the trend under the civil law, as reflected in Louisiana and elsewhere,' s
is to shy away from a form of absolute liability upon the part of the
parent and to seek some middle ground closer to the modern common-law
cases.
As the experience under the judicially declared law on the subject has
not been particularly favorable to persons harmed by the acts of minors,
a few of the American states have taken legislative action to resolve the
problem of parental responsibility for juvenile delinquency. Certain of
these states have done little more than codify their version of the commonlaw theory of parental non-liability,' 9 with some special legislation which
could make the parent liable in particular areas. 20 In three states, to-wit:
Louisiana, Nebraska, and most recently in Michigan, the legislative measures purport to hold parents responsible generally for the minor's torts,
but the absoluteness of the liability so created has been averted either by
case law, as in Louisiana, 21 by the fixing of a maximum penalty amount,
as in Michigan, 22 or by limiting the liability of the parent to cases of
property damage only. 23 The bulk of the legislation dealing with parental
civil liability, however, covers special subjects in more or less related fields
such as fence-breaking, 24 injury done by dogs or other animals owned or
26
herded by the minor child, 25 damage to and loss of school or library books,
1721 So. (2d) 748 (La. App., 1945). See also the Louisiana Appellate Court
holdings in Jackson v. Ratliff, 84 So. (2d) 103 (1956); Simmons v. Sorenson, 71
So. (2d) 377 (1954); La Rue v. Sorenson, 59 So. (2d) 226 (1950); and Jackson
Cookie Co. v. Burke, 45 So. (2d) 226 (1950).
is Sigouin v. Bissonette, [1955] Que. S. C. 265, 1955 Can. Abr. 682; Duchesne v.
Patronage Roc Amadour, [1955] R. L. 526, 1955 Can. Abr. 683.
19 Ga. Code Ann. 1935, Tit. 105, § 105-108; West Okla. Stat. Ann. 1941, Tit. 10,
Chn. 1, § 20, which statute was construed in the case of Stumpf v. Montgomery,
101 Okla. 257, 226 P. 65, 32 A. L. . 1490 (1924) ; S. D. Code 1939, Tit. 14, § 14.0309.
20 Compare S. D. Code 1939, Tit. 15, § 15.3009, with the provision cited In note
19, ante.
21 See cases cited in note 17, ante, interpreting and applying West La. Stat. Ann.,
Civil Code, 1952, Tit. 5, Art. 231&
22 Callaghan Mich. Stat. Ann., 1955 Supp., Ch. 266, § 27.1408(1)-(2), prescribes
a maximum of $300.
23 Neb. Rev. Stat. 1943, as reissued in 1952, Vol. 3, Ch. 43, § 43-801, refers to
damage done to real and personal property. See also the Michigan statute cited in
note 22, ante.
24 N. M. Stat. Ann. 1953, Ch. 47, § 9.
25 Conn. Rev. Stat. 1949, Ch. 151, § 3404; Mass. Ann. Laws 1949, Ch. 140, § 155;
N. M. Stat. Ann. 1953, Ch. 47, § 10.
26 Fla. Stat. Ann. 1941, Tit. 15, § 233.47; Neb. Rev. Stat. 1943, as reissued in
1950, VoL 5, Ch. 79, § 794, and § 121, which serve to make the pupil responsible
for damaged or lost books but which, when coupled with the general parent liability law, would make the parent likewise liable; and N. M. Stat. Ann. 1953, Ch.
73, § 9.
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damage to school buildings and property27 or to other forms of public and
private property, 28 and for the payment of judgments rendered against the
29

minor child.

Few cases exist throwing light on the operation or effectiveness of such
statutes, possibly because few such cases would be carried beyond the
trial stage, but the recent South Dakota case entitled Lambro Independent
Consolidated School District No. 20 v. Cawthornes ° reveals some of the
problems thereunder. The school district there concerned attempted to
charge the parents with liability for an alleged intentional and substantial
damage done to a school building at midnight by one of the students.3 1
Noting that the statute relied on created an exception to the general doctrine as to parental non-liability,8 2 hence should be strictly construed, and
particularly made parental liability dependent upon the "complaint of the
teacher," the court said the damage had to be committed at a time when
the teacher was present and able to acquire actual, or at least constructive,
knowledge of the happening. As the child was not under the immediate
or constructive supervision of the teacher at the time the destruction
occurred, the parents were absolved from liability. The court was able
to reach that result on the ground the statute, which had been in existence
since 1893 without any substantial change,33 had been modelled on an
earlier California statute, 84 which model had later been changed so as to
make the liability of the parent hinge not upon the complaint of the
teacher but upon the act of the minor child. 5 It should be noted, therefore,
that in certain of the jurisdictions liability will depend on the fact that
the complaint is originated by a specifically authorized person 6 whereas
27 Ariz. Code Ann. 1939, Ch. 54, § 504; Ark. Stat. Ann. 1947, Ch. 19, § 80-1906,
which makes the tort-feasor liable but, when coupled with ibid., Ch. 41, §§ 4230-4,

would also make the parent liable for damage to a school house or the like; West
Cal. Stat. Ann., Educ. Code, 1955, Ch. 1, § 16074; Maine Rev. Stat. 1954, Ch. 41,
§ 233; Miss. Code Ann., 1954 Supp., Ch. 5, §6216-04, superseding § 6221 of the
1942 Code; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. 1947, Tit. § 75-2801; West N. J. Stat. Ann.
1937, §18:14-51; Ore. Rev. Stat. 1955, § 336-170; S. D. Code 1939, §15.3009.
28 Ark. Stat. Ann. 1947, Ch. 41, § §4230-4; Vernon Mo. Stat. Ann. 1949, Vol. 3,
Ch. 8, § 160.
29 N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1955, §592.17.
80- S. D. -, 73 N. W. (2d) 337 (1955).
81 The action was based on S. D. Code 1939, § 15.3009, which states that "any
pupil, who cuts, defaces, or otherwise injures any schoolhouse, apparatus, or outbuilding thereof, is liable to any suspension or expulsion; and, on complaint of the
teacher to any member of the school board, the parents or guardians of such pupil
shall be liable for all damage."
32 B. D. Code 1939, §14.0309, states: "Neither parent nor child is answerable,
as such, for the act of the other."
33 The only alteration had been made by S. D. Laws, 1955, Ch. 41, § 19, which
changed the word "pupil" to "student" and omitted the word "any" in the phrase
"liable to any suspension or expulsion."
84 Cal. Laws 1873-4, Ch. 543, § 66, p. 112.
85 West Cal. Stat. Ann., Educ. Code, 1955, Ch. 1, § 16074.
86In Arizona, by "trustees ;"in Arkansas, by a "teacher or other person having
control;" In Maine, by an "attendance officer;" in Montana, by a "Teacher or any
Trustee ;" and in Oregon, by a "teacher."
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other jurisdictions either avoid this technicality altogether 37 or specifically
extend relief to private persons, partnerships, corporations or associations
whose property may have been damaged.38
Reports of the successful results attained under the Michigan statute
in reducing property damage by juvenile delinquents 9 have no doubt
inspired other jurisdictions to contemplate similar action. New York
recently attempted to so legislate, fixing a vicarious liability upon the
40
parent to the extent of $250, but it is understood the bill was vetoed
because of the substantial opposition voiced by several social and legal
organizations 4 1 who seem to have believed that the measure would not
only interfere with a rehabilitative program already in progress but would
also produce a further degenerative effect upon the strain already existing
in the familial relationships of juvenile delinquents. 42 The legal associations voicing objection relied on the point that the language of the bill was
vague and in need of clarification, since it might be judicially interpreted
so as to release the negligent, condoning, or ratifying parent from an
43
already established common-law liability.

37 See, for example, Miss. Code Ann., 1954 Supp. § 6216-04; West N. J. Stat.
Ann. 1937, § 18:14-51.
38 Mich. Stat. Ann. 1955, Cum. Supp., §27.1408(1), as amended by Pub. Acts,
1955, No. 48.
39 An article by Howard Whitman, entitled "Michigan Puts it Up to the
Parents," printed in the November, 1955, issue of Family Circle, was reprinted in
The Reader's Digest, March, 1956, at p. 161. It states: "In . . .Detroit, cases of
malicious destruction of property dropped from 244 the year before the Parental
Responsibility Act to 192 the year thereafter . . .Adjacent Lincoln Park reports

a decrease in vandalism of about 50 percent . . . In Battle Creek vandalism cases
fell 55 percent, and in Pontiac 41 percent."
40 See New York Assembly Bill No. 627, Pr. 632 of Jan. 16, 195M, which declared:
"A parent, guardian or other person having legal custody of an infant sixteen
years of age or under who wilfully, maliciously or unlawfully destroys or injures
any real or personal property of another, is liable in a civil action for damages
for such injury done, provided no recovery may be had in such action against
such parent, guardian or other person in excess of two hundred and fifty dollars."
See press release as to veto dated March 20, 1956, and Time Magazine, Vol. LXVII,
No. 14, p. 23 (April 2, 1956), which reports that Governor Harriman ruefully concluded the bill would "give to troublesome delinquents a weapon against their
parents which they would not hesitate to use."
. 41 Among those opposed were the Chairman of the Temporary Commission on
Youth and Delinquency; the Chairman of the State Youth Commission; the New
York City Bar Association; the New York State Bar Association; the Jewish Child
Care Council; the United Parents Association; the New York City Council of
Churches; and the Citizens Commission for Children of New York City.
42 This view was expressed in a letter to the author, dated April 18, 1956, from
Bruce F. Meservy, Director of Public Relations, New York State Youth Commission. See also Hon. J. W. Poller, Justice of the Domestic Relations Court, in Public
Affairs Pamphlet No. 232, entitled "Back to What Woodshed?"', as issued by the
City of New York Child Study Association under date of March 2, 1954.
43 See New York State Bar Association Report No. 25, by Commission on State
Legislation for 1956, and Bulletin No. 5 of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Commission on State Legislation, February 27, 1956, pp. 273-5.
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It could also be said that there has been a growing voice in Illinois
with respect to the need for a measure of this nature.4 4 A growing awareness of the ever-present problem of juvenile delinquency, made sharper by
an expected near-term increase in the size of the youthful population, 45
has caused the Chicago Youth Commission to delve into the problem.
After some study and research, it has formulated some ideas regarding
remedial and preventive measures and it now recommends that bills designed to fix a measure of parental responsibility be introduced in the
state legislature.

46

It is not possible, at this time, to predict in what form these bills
will be cast, nor what objections may be made thereto, but it should be
remembered that not all of society's norms can be codified, much less
be judicially enforced. There are wide areas of environmental and social
conditioning which must be left to organized as well as to unorganized
non-governmental media for social control. Further, in a free society, it
is an open question as to just how far government should go in invading
the home, and whether or not the losses would be greater than the gains.
Sociologists, psychologists, welfare agencies, bar associations and legislative committees have very little compiled material and few well formulated
cases from which to evolve an opinion. If Illinois is to adopt a legislative
remedy, the program should be one to be embarked upon with extreme
care and not be blindly fashioned from the few existing experiments fabricated to date. The fundamental question is one which requires careful
consideration. If it can be resolved, all right-minded people would want
to bring the benefit of its solution to the aid of juvenile delinquents to
the end their plight might be alleviated. But the prevention of, or restitution for, monetary losses should be secondary; the building of good
citizens is, and should be, the prime objective.
MRs. K. WILCOX

44 The Chicago Sunday Tribune, April 15, 1956, Part 1, p. 9, reports that the
"Kiwanis Club of Austin has urged the Illinois legislature to enact laws to make
parents liable for civil damage up to $300 for vandalism committed by children
under 18 years of age." John Meegan, Superintendent of the Chicago Parental
School, testifying before the Chicago Youth Commission, has said that if "acts of
vandalism are committed, property Is destroyed, and parents are made to realize
what has been done-in a tangible, financial way-they will see to it that more
authority Is exerted and more supervision given the youngsters of today." See 1955
Report, Chicago Youth Commission, p. 10.
45The 1955 Report of the Chicago Youth Commission, at p. 4, estimates
that "the number of children between the ages of five and 19 will have increased
to 993,071 in 1960 over 811,736 in 1955."
46 Ibid., p. 39, sets forth a recommendation that "proposed legislation be introduced in the Illinois General Assembly to fix parental responsibility for financial
losses incurred through destruction of public or private property by children. This
measure, it Is believed, will discourage teen-age vandalism."

